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Peculiar Results and Theoretical Inconsistency of
New Keynesian Models
Minseong Kim
Abstract. In this paper, several flaws of the basic no-capital/labor-only New Keynesian
model, as in Gal´ı (2008), are discussed. Some flaws were left undiscovered because mass of
varieties n in Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator is often considered as not affecting overall outcomes.
Only when n = 1 would ordinary results of the basic New Keynesian model hold. To save
the theory, we consider the case where production function exhibits constant return to
scale for its input labor, then concludes that linear production function itself leads to
other sets of problems. The aforementioned results are proven by checking several limit
cases of the basic New Keynesian model, which itself is the limit case model of several New
Keynesian models. Then we show some problems with applying transversality condition
to consumption Euler equation of the model.
1. Introduction
Since Real Business Cycle and Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium rev-
olution, concerns of many economists have focused on amending Real Busi-
ness Cycle models to exhibit short-run non-neutrality of money in data, as
can be seen in Romer and Romer (1989). Out of these efforts came New Key-
nesian models, which incorporated both imperfect competition and sticky
price, sometimes also with sticky wage, that demonstrate the power of mon-
etary policy (Gal´ı (2008)). Today, central banks around the world use New
Keynesian models to aid monetary policy.
New Keynesian models themselves brought up theoretical concerns, such
as identification problems and possible conflicts with Lucas Critique, as in
Cochrane (2011) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2009). With recent fi-
nancial crisis, moves towards better microfoundations, incorporating recent
developments in microeconomics, that match with reality, such as financial
frictions, as in Christiano, Motto, Rostagno (2014), have become important
objective for New Keynesian economists.
We will demonstrate that there is a deeper theoretical issue that is not much
mentioned in economics circles.
When a New Keynesian model uses Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregator, as first
expounded in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and reduces to the basic New
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Keynesian model, as in Gal´ı (2008), by taking limit of some parameters
to constants, inconsistency in the basic New Keynesian model leads to in-
consistency in the model. This is done by first taking limit of the basic
New Keynesian model to classical monetary model, which does not end up
being inconsistent only when mass of varieties 0 < n ∈ R in Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator is 1. As n should not affect consistency when 0 < n, we instead
choose to sacrifice output elasticity in labor/technology-only Cobb-Douglas
production function and make labor’s output elasticity as 1, leading to con-
stant return-to-scale linear production function. It is then shown that with
the limiting case of zero natural rate of output and technology growth, in-
consistency arises again.
It is also shown that if we impose zero-profit-for-firms condition (for every
period) to classical monetary model, then output elasticity of Cobb-Douglas
production function has to come out as 1, and if output elasticity is 1 then
there is no profit for imperfectly-competitive firms every period in classical
monetary model. As classical monetary model is the limiting case of the ba-
sic New Keynesian model, if zero-profit condition is imposed to the limiting
case, then the conclusion that output elasticity of Cobb-Douglas production
function is 1 must follow even for the basic New Keynesian model.
That capital is missing from the basic New Keynesian model cannot be said
to be the sole reason for inconsistency - if limit of amount of capital K at
single period t is taken to zero, for the model we consider below, K remains
zero for every period along with investment I remaining zero also, reducing
the model to the basic New Keynesian model. Introduction of firm-specific
capital, as in Woodford (2003), does not help also, because then limit of
every firm’s firm-specific capital to zero can be taken, reducing the model
again to the basic labor-only New Keynesian model.
2. Inconsistency of the Basic Labor-only New Keynesian Model:
Dixit-Stiglitz Aggregation
We will follow Gal´ı (2008)’s basic labor-only New Keynesian model.
The representative household solves the following optimization problem:
max
Ct,Nt,Bt
E0
∞∑
k=0
βtU(Ct, Nt)
U(Ct, Nt) ≡ C
1−σ
t
1− σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
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with budget constraint
∫ n
0 Pt(i)Ct(i) di+QtBt ≤ Bt−1 +WtNt +Dt and
limT→∞Et{BT } ≥ 0, where Ct(i) represents consumption of firm i’s goods,
Nt represents hours worked and Bt represents the quantity of one-period,
nominal riskless discount bonds purchased, which pays one unit of money
at maturity, Qt is the price of bonds, Pt is price level, Wt is nominal wage,
Dt is dividends, which equal firms’ profits. (We assume that all profits of
firms are not kept and given away as dividends) n represents mass of vari-
eties factor in Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregation. Usually, n = 1 is chosen, but
this is not a fundamental condition required. We will see how n = 1 hides
inherent problems in the model.
Firms in this model are monopolistically competitive and are modelled by
Dixit-Stiglitz. Aggregate consumption level Ct is given by
Ct ≡
(∫ n
0
Ct(i)
ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
The household also maximizes Ct given fixed expenditure level Zt, which is
given by the following Lagrangian:
L1 =
[∫ n
0
Ct(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1 − λt
(∫ n
0
Pt(i)Ct(i) di− Zt
)
Regardless of n, the first-order condition is given by
Ct(i)
−1
ε C
1
ε
t = λtPt(i)
Therefore, Ct(i) = (λtPt(i))
−εCt. Recalling the expression of Ct above,
Ct =
[∫ n
0
(
(λtPt(i))
−εCt
) ε−1
ε
di
] ε
ε−1
Ct = λ
−ε
t Ct
(∫ n
0
Pt(i)
1−ε di
) ε
ε−1
λt =
(∫ n
0
Pt(i)
1−ε di
) 1
ε−1
=
1
Pt
Thus, regardless of what n is, the following holds:
Ct(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
Ct
Now let us take limit →∞ and price stickiness factor θ → 0. For now, the
full specification of price stickiness is not needed as long as we recognize that
we are taking the limit to frictionless perfect competition model. Therefore,
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in this limit Pt(i) and Ct(i) will be the same for ∀i.
Some calculations bring us the result
lim
ε→∞,θ→0
Ct = nCt(i)
lim
ε→∞,θ→0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
=
1
n
taking Ct(i) as constant for ∀i.
Production function for each firm i is:
Yt(i) = Ct(i) = AtNt(i)
1−α
Labor market clearing requires Nt =
∫ n
0 Nt(i) di and
Nt =
∫ n
0
(
Yt(i)
At
) 1
1−α
di
Nt =
∫ n
0

(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
Yt
At

1
1−α
di
Nt =
(
Yt
At
) 1
1−α ∫ n
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
) −ε
1−α
di
In θ → 0 limit, Pt(i) can be thought as being constant for all firms, and
therefore,
Nt =
(
Yt
At
) 1
1−α
n
(
Pt(i)
Pt
) −ε
1−α
As long as 1− α > 0, the limit limε→∞,θ→0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
can be used, and there-
fore,
lim
ε→∞,θ→0
Nt =
(
Yt
At
) 1
1−α
n
1
n
=
(
Yt
At
) 1
1−α
This confirms our intuition that regardless of n, the basic New Keyne-
sian model’s production function collapses to classical monetary monetary
model’s production function when ε→∞ and θ → 0 which is given by
Yt = AtN
1−α
t .
Note that we used good markets clearing equation Yt(i) = Ct(i) ∀i.
This suggests that we have two equal representations of Yt for limit
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limε→∞,θ→0:
Yt = AtN
1−α
t = At
[∫ n
0
Nt(i) di
]1−α
Yt =
[∫ n
0
Yt(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
=
[∫ n
0
(
AtNt(i)
1−α) ε−1ε di] εε−1
We did not yet take the limit for the second form of Yt - we will do so. As
Nt(i) is constant in this limit, for the first form of Yt,
Yt = Atn
1−αNt(i)1−α
For the second form of Yt,
Yt = lim
ε→∞,θ→0
At
[∫ n
0
Nt(i)
(1−α)(ε−1)
ε di
] ε
ε−1
= lim
ε→∞,θ→0
Atn
ε
ε−1Nt(i)
1−α
Yt = AtnNt(i)
1−α
Therefore, in this limit,
Yt = Atn
1−αNt(i)1−α = AtnNt(i)1−α
which suggests n1−α = n, unless At = 0 or Nt(i) = 0 - which cannot happen
as this will make output zero all the time.
If α is considered as any arbitrary constant 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, as often done, then
the only way of not violating n1−α = n is when n = 1, because n > 0.
We now see the first trouble with the New Keynesian model. When n = 1, as
often set by many authors, the problem never reveals itself. However, when
n 6= 1, the model will have to be inconsistent, unless α is set to 0, as that is
the only value where n1−α collapses to n. If α = 0, then any n > 0 can be
used, and the basic New Keynesian model for now is saved.
One may say the result only implies that the basic New Keynesian model
does not become classical monetary model in the limit, but our result has
nothing to do with convergence to classical monetary model. In fact, for our
proofs, there was no reference to classical monetary model.
Also, n = 1 choice has no deep theoretical basis - it is chosen out of conve-
nience. Our problematic results are thus relevant.
Our result does raise a suspicion that there is a problem with labor clearing
equation
∫ n
0 Nt(i) di = Nt. However, it is worth mentioning that the equa-
tion is not just derived from the intuition that Nt is the sum of all inputs to
firms. In this basic New Keynesian model, labor market is perfectly competi-
tive with perfect labor substitutability. And assuming an aggregator similar
to Dixit-Stiglitz, and taking analogy of Yt to Nt, the result does collapse
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to Nt =
∫ n
0 Nt(i) di. What can be done to remedy the problem will not be
discussed in this section.
3. A Peculiar Result of the Basic New Keynesian Model with
Linear Production Function
In the previous section, we showed that α = 0 is needed to save the basic
New Keynesian model. Let us impose this condition, which makes the pro-
duction function of each firm in the model Yt(i) = AtNt(i). This can also be
viewed as a consistency check by limiting case of α = 0.
As Yt =
[∫ n
0 Yt(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
, when θ → 0, Yt = n εε−1Yt(i) = n εε−1At Ntn =
n
1
ε−1AtNt.
Let us assume the limit θ → 0 for now. We first consider the case where
by log-linear approximation, Yt = AtNt, as done in Gal´ı (2008). This is true
without using approximation when n = 1. We will abuse using n = 1 for
now, as showing inconsistency only requires proving for one particular n.
When n = 1, θ → 0, marginal product of labor, or MPNt is MPNt = At, as
can be seen by taking partial derivative. Let us defined real marginal cost
as RMCt. Then,
RMCt =
Wt/Pt
MPNt
=
Wt/Pt
At
=
WtNt
PtYt
As RMCt = (ε− 1) /ε at θ = 0,
ε− 1
ε
Yt =
WtNt
Pt
By the accounting logic of the model, or by the budget constraint equality
for maximization of utility,
PtYt = WtNt + Profitt = WtNt +Dt
Yt =
WtNt
Pt
+
Dt
Pt
Dt
Pt
=
1
ε
Yt
Maximizing maxCt,Nt,Bt E0
∑∞
k=0 β
tU(Ct, Nt) under constraints requires
first-order condition of
Wt
Pt
= Cσt N
ϕ
t
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Thus,
ε− 1
ε
Yt = Y
σ
t N
ϕ+1
t
Y 1−σt =
ε
ε− 1N
ϕ+1
t
Yt =
(
ε
ε− 1
) 1
1−σ
N
ϕ+1
1−σ
t = AtNt
N
ϕ+σ
1−σ
t = At
(
ε
ε− 1
) −1
1−σ
Let us now take the limit ε→∞ also. Then,
lim
ε→∞Yt = N
ϕ+1
1−σ
t = AtNt
We are at the classical limit again. Now we take advantage of measurement
invariance that this classical limit must satisfy. That is, even if it is possible
to scale output Yt for ∀t by constant factor to Y 1t = Yt/k ∀t where k > 0 and
k ∈ R, important conclusions of an economic model should remain invariant.
This is because for n = 1, Yt = AtNt and Yt(i) = AtNt(i). And as Nt(i) is
equal for every firm and
∫ 1
0 Nt(i) di = Nt, scaling At by constant factor will
not disrupt consistency. After all, if Yt is indeed affected by scale factor,
then we have to be very careful every time we measure real output, despite
the fact that goods in this model are infinitely divisible. We now show
that Aj = A0 − ν0 must be 1, if natural technology factor growth rate exists.
At = Ajg
tνt
Yt = Ajg
tνtNt
Y 1t ≡ Yt/Aj = gtνtNt
where Aj is constant factor that represents initial t = 0 technology factor
At without νt technology shock, g represents natural growth factor of At
and νt is random technology shock such that ln νt is assumed to follow
N (0, σ2a). We can modify the specification of ln νt to allow technology shock
inertia, but the specification will not matter much for our purpose, as long
as limT→∞Et [νT ] = 1 for ∀t.
Now check marginal product of labor for both Yt and Y
1
t , and we get:
MPNt = At = Ajg
tνt =
Wt
Pt
= Y σt N
ϕ
t
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MPN1t = g
tνt =
W 1t
P 1t
=
(
Y 1t
)σ
Nϕt
This leads to:
νt =
(
Y 1t
)σ
Nϕt
gt
=
Y σt N
ϕ
t
Ajgt
(
Y 1t
)σ ≡ Y σt
Aσj
=
Y σt
Aj
As Aj cannot be zero, Aj = 1 in order for the equation to be consistent.
Now let us take the limiting case g → 1.
lim
T→∞,g→1
Et [YT ] = lim
T→∞
Et [νTNT ] = lim
T→∞
Et [NT ] = lim
T→∞
Et
[
N
ϕ+1
1−σ
T
]
The only case that does not restrict on the value of ϕ and σ is when Nt = 1.
This suggests that in zero growth rate, limT→∞Et [YT ] = 1, ∀t. While this is
not entirely unjustifiable answer, the intuition that we can start from some
steady output level that is not 1 has to be given up. This destruction of
intuition seems very unjustifiable.
While there may be different options on not restricting Nt by restricting the
possible values of σ and ϕ, the only option that does not require any other
restrictions is when (ϕ+ 1)/(1− σ) = 1. Then, −σ = ϕ. This restriction is
unjustifiable.
We often impose the following conditions to U(Ct, Nt): UC,t > 0, UCC,t ≤
0, UN,t ≤ 0, UNN,t ≤ 0. These conditions will not be satisfied by −σ = ϕ
when the utility form is U =
C1−σt
1−σ −
N1+ϕt
1+ϕ .
As a side note, for the result that limT→∞Et [νTNT ] = limT→∞Et [NT ], the
long-run understanding of natural rate is invoked.
Because this is the limiting case, the results here affect the entire basic New
Keynesian model.
4. Deriving α = 0 with no profit assumption in classical
monetary model
The limit θ → 0, ε→∞ model of the basic New Keynesian model, classical
monetary model, does not impose long-run zero profit condition. Here, we go
to the extreme and prove that if we impose zero profit condition at ∀t, then
α = 0. If firms earn zero profit, then by the accounting or budget constraint
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logic and specification of production function,
Yt =
WtNt
Pt
= AtN
1−α
t
MPNt =
Wt
Pt
= (1− α)AtN−αt
Thus,
AtN
1−α
t = (1− α)AtN1−αt
Therefore, α = 0.
The assumption of short-run zero profit is not entirely unjustifiable - if eco-
nomic agents realize that just by forming a firm would give them free lunch,
economic agents will enter the business quickly when without entry costs. In
such case, agents will work as workers but also as firm manager, because this
limiting model does not have capital nor requirement of a firm manager to
“manage” workers. Therefore,the only case where this is prevented is when
firms earn zero profit.
5. A New Keynesian model with capital and the limiting case of
the basic New Keynesian model
We now show that existence of capital does not destroy our results by pre-
senting a New Keynesian model with capital that in θ → 0,K → 0 reduces
to the basic labor-only New Keynesian model. The model presented below
is slightly modified from Duffy and Xiao (2011).
Utility maximization remains the same as the basic New Keynesian model,
except that it is now under the following budget constraint:
Ct +Qt
Bt
Pt
+ It =
Wt
Pt
Nt +
Rt
Pt
Kt +
Bt−1
Pt
+
Dt
Pt
where RtKt/Pt represents real capital rental income and It represents new
investment. The following equation is imposed on new investment:
It = I
(
Kt+1
Kt
)
Kt
where I (·) represents capital adjustment cost function of Kt+1/Kt, as in
Woodford (2003).
Production function form each firm i, in Duffy and Xiao is:
Yt(i) = Kt(i)
αNt(i)
1−α
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But we modify it to:
Yt(i) = AtKt(i)
κNt(i)
1−α
where 1 + κ− α ≤ 1 (constant or decreasing returns to scale) and the same
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator for Yt out of Yt(i) is in place. This makes the orig-
inal production function model the limiting case. While the solutions will
have to be different if α 6= κ, the structure of the model is not changed, and
therefore there is no problem with this choice.
Note that in this model, Yt = Ct + It. Therefore, for the result Yt(i) =
()−ε Yt, Ct cannot be simply substituted in place of Yt. The result is jus-
tified, if we consider that agents maximize Yt − It given expenditure level
Zt. As the first order condition will remain the same except that now Ct is
Yt and Ct(i) is Yt(i), the result follows.
Because this model exhibits perfectly competitive capital market with per-
fect substitutability, Kt =
∫ n
0 Kt(i) di.
In this model, we cannot simply take the limit κ→ 0+,K → 0+; if we set
K = 0, then perform limit κ→ 0+, then the limit will simply be zero, re-
sulting in zero output. What should be done instead is getting a special case
model of κ = 0. This results in a model where capital does not really take
part of production of goods, but produced goods are used as investment
to replenish depreciating capital. But utility maximization implies that in
equilibrium, K = 0. Thus, without a need to enforce directly K → 0, κ = 0
model is equivalent to the model with limit K → 0 and κ = 0. The It equa-
tion suggests that It → 0, as K → 0, and limKt→0Kt(i)0 = 1. Thus Yt = Ct,
Yt = AtNt(i)
1−α, and the budget constraint reduces to the labor-only New
Keynesian model’s budget constraint.
By the argument that if an allowed special case exhibits inconsistency then
a model in general is inconsistent, our results in the previous sections are
not reversed by the introduction of capital.
6. Troubles with Consumption Euler Equation
Consumption Euler equation can be derived from the basic New Keynesian
model. We will skip the derivation for spacing reasons. The basic consump-
tion Euler equation and its derivation are well-known and can be found
easily. For this section, we will ignore the problems derived in the previous
sections.
The equation in log-linear consumption gap, or output gap in the basic New
Keynesian model is given by:
c˜t = Et [ ˜ct+1]− σ−1r˜t
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where r˜t = it − Et [pit+1]− rnt , rnt is natural real interest rate, it is nominal
short-run interest rate set by central bank, pit+1 represents inflation rate
at t+ 1, and c˜t represents consumption gap from its natural consumption
level. In the basic model, c˜t = y˜t. Every lowercase variable in the consum-
pion Euler equation is in log-linear form and every lowercase variable with
tilde represents gap from its natural rate.
Often transversality condition limt→∞Et [y˜t] = 0 and the nominal interest
rate rule given by Taylor rule, it = r + φpipit + φyy˜t + ηt where r is constant
factor and ηt = ρηηt−1 + ε
η
t with ε
η
t following N (0, σ2η) is AR(1) monetary
policy shock, are imposed to solve the solution for ct = yt. But it is clear
that if central bank targets real interest rate rt ≤ rnt for ∀t instead of Taylor
rule, then transversality condition cannot be satisfied (even zero output will
not save the transversality condition). As other parts of the model are mi-
crofounded, at least these parts themselves, even with non-Taylor monetary
rule, should be valid. This leaves only one big option to save transversality
condition: central bank cannot follow constant real interest rate. But how?
As we will see, this is not possible at least inside the New Keynesian model
without Taylor rule.
For simplification, let us assume that φy = 0. Central bank only responds to
change in inflation, and by Blanchard-Khan condition, φpi > 1 is assumed.
While Woodford (2003) shows more of global multiplicity of equilibria prob-
lem, we will use Cochrane (2011)’s flexible example as suitable. After all,
the flexible limit of the New Keynesian model exists, and unless one believes
that stickiness allows for determination of inflation rate and flexible price
allows for infinitely many equilibria, our limiting case is a fine use.
Flexible and sticky case only differ by the following: Fisher equation is
it = rt + Et [pit+1], and in flexible case, as in Cochrane (2011), rt = r, but
this equality is not satisfied when stickiness is introduced, even though
limT→∞Et [r˜T ] = 0. When flexible price is assumed, the resulting equation
is:
pit+1 = φpipit + ηt + δt+1
where δt+1 is sunspot random variable with Et [δt+1] = 0. In this equation,
every equilibrium solution except one solution exhibits inflation explosion.
Cochrane (2011) argues that there is no reason to eliminate explosive solu-
tions, as transversality condition is used only for eliminating real explosions.
One representative New Keynesian response to Cochrane (2011) can be seen
in Wren-Lewis (2013), referencing Woodford (2003). Simon Wren-Lewis ar-
gues that central bank’s intended inflation target known to agents is good
enough to make agents return to central bank’s intended inflation target,
which is given by the non-explosive inflation equilibrium. In New Keynesian
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model, agents first form expectation of future inflation rates from t+ 1 to
∞. Then central bank sets nominal interest rate which equilibrates y˜t and
pit and possibly adjust future inflation expectations that are consistent with
Taylor rule, since pit = βEt [pit+1] + ψy˜t (New Keynesian Phillips Curve),
where ψ is constant value, and Taylor rule has factor φpipit. For pit equation,
what is not determined is y˜t which is dependent on nominal interest rate it,
and nominal interest rate rule itself is dependent on pit, by Taylor rule. The
current values of y˜t and pit all depend on future and current real interest
rates.
Now for our frictionless case, y˜t = 0, and therefore, future inflation expec-
tations determines pit completely. Central bank may influence this future
inflation expectation by changing φpi, but unless central bank does change
the reaction coefficient, only εηt may change future inflation expectation.
This shows an important difference between frictionless and sticky case when
dealing with nominal interest rate rule. In sticky case, following Taylor rule
requires that nominal interest rate equilibrates output gap and inflation rate,
and therefore output effect of monetary policy that feeds back to current
inflation rate becomes very important. But as we are in frictionless case we
do not have to consider this possibility.
This suggests that nominal interest rate rule given by Taylor rule is passive,
given “rational” expectations or beliefs of future inflation rates, expected
nominal interest rate can be determined. The fact that central bank follows
Taylor rule, combined with inflation target announcement and continuously
increasing inflation rate, is enough to show, according to Simon Wren-Lewis,
that agents have wrong beliefs of an economy.
But this response requires that intended inflation target be achievable, and
the only mean for central bank to enforce the target in the basic New Key-
nesian model is by the control on short-run nominal interest rate. Unless
central bank has control on nominal interest rate unconditionally, there is
no rational reason to believe in central bank’s inflation target.
With this observation, consider the alternate interest rule of constant real
interest rate for ∀t. Assume that both central bank and agents know Taylor
rule and the constant rate rule, but agents initially expect Taylor rule-styled
policy even when central bank announces its constant real interest rate rule.
Central bank has full knowledge of inflation expectations. Agents first set
expectation for future inflation rates, which form forward-looking and the
only inflation part of the right-hand side of New Keynesian Phillips curve,
based on Taylor rule. With these expectations set, central bank sets nominal
interest rate without much concern for equilibrium. It does not care whether
disequilibrium results in due to its policy. It just sets nominal interest rate
it such that it = r1 + Et [pit+1], with the knowledge that agents will change
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their future expectations by the belief that central bank has to follow Taylor
rules - suggesting that agents treat any deviation from non-stochastic Taylor
rule as being induced by εηt . Therefore, central bank considers not initial fu-
ture inflation expectation, but rather final future inflation expectation from
initial future inflation expectation, as Et [pit+1]. Notice that there is no pit
in Fisher equation. This process will continuously upset agents, until agents
realize that central bank does indeed not follow Taylor rule and does have
power to commit to constant real interest rate rule.
Agents may rely on market to form their expectation, but as long as cen-
tral bank controls currency, it will still be set by central bank. Therefore,
agents either have to abandon currency or have to assume constant real
interest with stochastic variations announced by central bank. The former
requires a model to back up and is definitely outside the realm of New Key-
nesian models. When constant real interest rate is assumed by every agent,
transversality condition limT→∞Et [y˜T ] = 0 is no longer satisfied, if r1 6= rnt
(r1 = rt in this rule). (Furthermore, note that while one may decide to elim-
inate transversality condition, the basic consumption Euler equation will go
in conflict with some variants of the basic New Keynesian Phillips curve,
such as Sticky-Information Phillips curve, as in Mankiw and Reis (2002).)
In such a case, agents form rational expectation for future inflation rates
and central bank set just nominal interest rate based on these expectations.
Of course under New Keynesian solution-picking assumptions, the model is
unsolvable. After all, natural rate hypothesis will need to be abandoned in
any equilibrium solution, not just a standard New Keynesian equilibrium.
The violation of natural rate suggests that it may necessarily need to add
either long-run adjustment or other anchoring mechanisms directly. For ex-
ample, instead of other interest rates anchored to the interest rate related to
central interest rate, which are assumptions of the New Keynesian model,
expected long-run interest rates set by market may be more of reference even
for short-run interest rates. The other possibility goes with replacing nat-
ural rate hypothesis with some expectation anchoring assumption, such as
Farmer (2013)’s nominal GDP anchoring, expressed by Et [∆xt+1] = ∆xt.
This expectation will not be rational expectation. In a similar vein, Sumner
(2014) argues for nominal GDP target, instead of interest rate/inflation
targeting.
7. Conclusion
We have demonstrated that log-linearized equations of New Keynesian mod-
els hide the fact that the model may have actually failed to establish equilib-
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rium and is under disequilibrium. To make the models establish equilibrium,
two choices can be considered. One may modify labor clearing equation∫ n
0 Nt(i) di = Nt to the form of equations that involve a different labor ag-
gregator which does not reduce to the original labor clearing equation in
any limiting case. This implies that the definition of Nt has to change - it
is no longer the sum of all labor inputs applied. Instead of modifying labor
clearing equation, Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator may be replaced by a different
aggregator. Again, though, there is no purpose of modifying an aggregator
of a model, if the aggregator reduces to Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
We also have shown that transversality condition y˜t = 0 in the basic New
Keynesian model cannot be enforced when central bank actively engages to
set constant real interest rate that deviates from natural output level yn,
and central bank can do this by not following Taylor rule and actively en-
gaging. While constant non-natural interest rate may make market form a
new currency, it must first be suspected that more equations, particularly
related to expectation, are needed to enforce long-run natural rate of out-
put independent of central bank policy - that is, the model is incomplete
abstraction of reality. Anchoring may be done by anchoring expected future
nominal output to current nominal output, which may or may not replace
output gap transversality condition.
If we limit the purpose of New Keynesian models as explaining only very
short-run phenomena, then the issues related to consumption Euler equa-
tion may not be actual problems, but this of course requires explicating how
long long-run adjustments would not be dominant.
Looking from historical context, it may also be necessary to introduce money
directly into the basic New Keynesian model. In AD-AS-IS-LM model, mon-
etary expansion leads to LM curve shifting right, with temporarily lower
real/nominal interest rate and higher real output. But this causes shift in
AD curve to right also, causing higher price level. This higher price level
must be reflected back into LM curve, along with AS-side adjustments,
which means AS curve shift left and LM curves shifts left to equilibrate
at natural output rate. The key point of this model is that adjustment takes
time, and this allows short-run non-neutrality. But in long-run, equilibration
at natural output and interest rate must occur. Or, from a different angle,
one may imagine disequilibrium process that eventually establishes natural
rate equilibrium. It is true that AD-AS-IS-LM is outdated, but it may be
possible to take cues from price level adjustment that allows adjustment
back to natural rate. We wish that future progress show up to clarify these
matters.
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